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AGENCY -
ASSAULT IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
A very interesting fact situation in the Law of Agency is presented
in Baskett v, Banks (1), which was decided by the Supreme Court of
ApPeals on November 26, 1947. In an able but very involved opinion,
Yr. Justice Staples reversed and remanded for a new trial a truly
unique case, the facts of which occurred in Norfolk on August 21, 1946.
In this case, P purchased a ticket at a motion picture theatre
at 4495 Hampton Boulevard, Norfolk (owned by D), and while seated inside
in an apparently intoxicated condition was ejected bcdily by thz. theatre
manager and a fellow emnlQyee. af2zer (D.s version: having first been
asked politely to go outside and get some air) (P's versionL having
wilfully, maliciously, and without cause, been assaulted by the manager
and a fellow employee, who hit P over the head several times with a
flashlight, then catapulted P out the doo: onto the sidewa.k). P,
after having been ejected from the theatre, was in a highly excited
condition and remained in front of the theatre haranguing would-be
patrons and calling the manager vile names. P finally moved up the
street about 50 feet from the theatre when the manager, who was then on
his way home, passed him. P again applied the same vile epithets to the
manager, who then struck P a violent blow with his fist, knocking him into
the street. P was rendered unconscious from this blow and was carried
home in a police ambulance, called by the ticket-.seller at the manangerts
direction. P was subsequently hospitalized. P sought damages of $10,000,
and the jury returned a verdict of $500 in his favor. D's motion to have
the verdict set aside as contrary to the law and evidence and for inade-
quate damages was disallowed by the trial court. P appealedo
The trial court submitted to the jury the question whether the second
assault was so closely related to the first that the manager would be
deemed to be still acting as the agent of D when it occurred, or whether
it was an entirely separate and independent act, unrelated to his official
duties or employment, for which D, his employer, would not be liable.
The appellate court held the granting of this instruction constituted
reversible error, because it could not be determined in the state of the
record whether the jury found D liable for both assaults or only one, nor
did the evidence' satisfactorily show the extent of the damages sustained
in each. D's requested instruction that the manager was outside the scope
of his employment because he failed to revoke P"s license befrre ejecting
him was also granted by the trial court This was held to be prejudicial
error, because D had not placed sufficient evidence before the jury to
show revocation of P's liconse (by returning to P the admission price)
before ejecting him, the theory of D's pleadings being rather that the
alleged misconduct of P in the theatre constituted justification for P's
expulsion without the necessity of first ruvoking P's license.
In asking for a jury verdict on each sevarate assault, Mr. Justice
Staples is in effect demanding a special 'verdvl.- (2), and it seems to the
present wrfter that that is the only way the p esen case can be ade-
quately resolved. In remanding, Mr. Justice Staples also stated that the
jury should be instructed upon the question of whether or not the second
assault grew out of and was the proximate result of the first attack, and
held that the stcond assault would have been within the scope of the manager's
employment (making D liable) if its purpose was to stop P's statements to
prospective patrons. Justice Staples further cautioned that such an
instruction should not place on P the burden of proving absolutely and
precisely the extent of injuries rv's lting from each attack, but that the
jury should be left free to form their own judgment from the evidence
introduced,
Justice Staples' analysis of this case is clearly in accord with
modern law on the point. The Restatement of Agency (3) states: "An
act may be within the scope of employment, ilth6ugh done in part to serve
the purposes of the servant or of a third person". In Davis v. Merrill
(4), the Supreme Court of Appeals announced the doctrine--t both corpora-
tions and individuals should be required to answer ift damages for wanton
and malicious assaults inflicted upon others by their servants, while
acting within the scope of the servants' employment and duty, stating:
"It matters not whether the act of the servant is due to a lack of judg-
ment, infirmity of temper, or the influence of passion, or that the servant
goes beyond (italics mine) his strict line of duty and authority in
inflicting such injiry". (5) However, if a plaintiff seeks punitive
damages, it must be shown that the principal in some way ordered or
ratified those acts of the survant. (3)
At first blush, the Virginia court in the instant case has rejected
the "going and coming" rtle followed in mony jurisdictions. In Mo Lamb
v. Beasley (7), the North Carolina Surpeme Court stated the rule as
follows: "In determining the liability of a master on the theory of
respondeat superior for a tort of the servant, the servant is generally
not in the course of his employment while going to end returning from
his work". The present case is not necessarily inconsistent with this
rule, however, since it is highly arguable that the second assault was
the proximate result of thc first.
Two recent cases have been found which are almost "on all fours"
with the present case. In the California case of Haworth v. Elliott
(8), bartenders in charge of a berroom during thG barkeepor's absence
were authorized to maintain order and protect their employer's property.
In doing so, the bartenders ejected a patron for allegedly creating a
disturbance and brok. his finger, nose, and caused him other bodily
injuries. They were held to be acting within the scope of their employ-
ment and the( omployer was held liable for their usa of excessive force
causing injuries to the patron, regardless 'Of whethecr the alleged blows
were struck by them before they emerged from the barroom or thereafter
on the sidewalk (italics mine). This case is distinguishablu on its
facts from the present case, however, because here there was no lapse
of time between the successive assaults.
In the Louisiana case of Fealey v. Playlnnd Amusement Co. (9), a
patron of an amusement concession wasstruck by employees of the concession
who were seeking to prev;ntvmndalism. In the ensuing struggle, the
patron in turn struck one of the employees befori h6 was overpowered and
taken to a storeroom. Hero the patron was again struck while seated
in a chair. It was held that the owner of the amuserent concession
could not escape liability (italics-m e) for assault on the ground
that t--blows struck by his employees while in the storeroom were in
retaliation for the 'blow received from the patron and not in discharge
of any-duty in connection with their employment.
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